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Abstract
This chapter provides concluding reflections from a set of nineteen case studies of transnational and intra-
national migration and mobility. It contrasts the ‘sedentary bias’ present in policy regimes and associated
thought centred on nation-states, where movement is seen as exceptional, including normatively exceptional,
with the centrality of movement in the processes of socio-economic change and evolution, particularly those
promoted under capitalist systems of economic organization. While market capitalist and nation-state principles
of organization differ, they combine in hybrid systems, such as those currently being elaborated in policy
regimes for temporary migrant workers, to exploit migrant labour. Many of these arrangements mirror the
indentured labour regimes of earlier eras. The chapter presents by contrast a perspective based on principles of
human rights and human security that uses a global framework both for understanding and for evaluation and
then adds an explicit gender-aware enrichment of that perspective, in order to do justice to the special vulner-
abilities and exploitation of women’s migrant labour. A human security perspective, in particular, helps to base
concern for human rights in an awareness of bodily and emotional needs, of global interconnections, and of
the intersecting circumstances in people’s everyday lives; but it requires, and lends itself to, gender-enrichment
through partnership with insights from feminist theory, as illustrated in the book’s various case studies. The sys-
tems of the nation-state, market capitalism, and gender power that are discussed in this chapter, that structure
the experiences of migrant women workers, are very deeply established. The chapter suggests directions for
possible re-cognition, to reduce and counter the invisibility and misframing of migration, and of women and
their work; it also suggests priority areas for research and networking following the format employed for the
book: linking researchers, policy practitioners and migrant advocates, South-South-North.
Keywords: Women’s migration, human security, human rights. migration regimes, globalization, women’s
labour, intersectionality.
21.1 Themes
This book reflects the great scale and reach of con-
temporary migration and its far-reaching impacts, no-
tably the frequently problematic outcomes in terms of
quality of life and well-being for many of the more vul-
nerable migrants, especially women. Mobility is a nor-
mal and necessary component in the processes of eco-
nomic, social and personal development and
evolution, and of learning and cultural enrichment
(section 21.2). Yet in a world structured around,
firstly, a nation-state system and nationalist principles
of identity, mobility – at least the mobility of poor
people – is treated as not normal, and it is assumed
that migrants do not have to receive normal treat-
ment. ‘People on the move’ was the title of the chap-
ter on migration in the report Human Security Now
(CHS 2003). As counterpart to that phrase we take in-
stead ‘women in motion’ (Oishi 2005) for the title of
this concluding chapter, since ‘women on the move’
has become mostly used as a catchphrase for upward
professional mobility, which does not fit the cases ad-
dressed in this book. 
Contemporary migration is structured, secondly,
by the pull of market power and by largely capital-cen-
tred policy calculation (section 21.3). Nowadays minis-
tries of finance and economic affairs often dominate
migration policy, not ministries of social welfare or la-
bour. Within these market processes, women’s labour
is especially in demand. The principles of the capital-
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ist market are fundamentally different from those of
the nation-state.1 The former is not only open to mi-
gration but actively generates it, and current migra-
tion is in part a response to greatly increased global
and intra-national inequality.2 But the two sets of prin-
ciples are widely combined in hybrid policy regimes
which seek to maximize profit while minimizing per-
ceived costs to national identity in richer states. These
hybrid regimes draw on migrant labour while mini-
mizing the rights granted (sections 21.4–21.6). 
Thirdly, central to the investigations in this book,
a remarkably high proportion of migrant labour is
now women’s labour. Around eighty per cent of Indo-
nesia’s international labour migrants, for example, are
women (Sukamdi 2008); a similar percentage among
Burmese workers in factories in Thailand is reported
in various studies (Pearson/Kusakabe 2012: 78). Yet
this feature is still relatively little considered in policy
discourse and even in much research on migration.
Women’s work, whether in formal or informal work-
places or in homes, whether in labour-importing coun-
tries or labour-exporting countries, remains to a large
extent ‘invisible’ (section 21.7). Thus, in addition to
the structuring roles of legal and policy regimes and
of market forces, structures of gender power are also
at play in the huge growth of exploitation of migrant
women’s labour, as we outlined in the Introduction. 
Nowadays, women may even constitute the major-
ity of international migrants, given the scale of de-
mand for their labour in most sectors, reflecting their
perceived greater docility because of family commit-
ments,3 and especially the demand for their services
as care workers, maids, and providers of sexual serv-
ices (for pleasure, intimacy and emotional wellbeing
as well as for biological reproduction). These last
three roles and more are combined in the case of ar-
ranged foreign brides, as illustrated in chapter 5.
Enormous numbers of women from low-income
countries, and especially from South and South-East
Asia, now play such roles in richer countries. Many
chapters in this book address a new global class of
women, who form one of the largest groups of inter-
national migrant workers and yet whose labour is not
recognized as ‘real’ ‘work’ by domestic laws and mi-
gration regimes, and who thus work with little protec-
1 This essay adopts the usage ‘nation-state’ rather than
‘nation state’. Historically such terms were originally
used to help differentiate between types of state: com-
pared to a city state or empire a nation state was a “sov-
ereign state of which most of the citizens or subjects are
united also by factors which define a nation, such as lan-
guage or common descent” (Oxford Dictionary of Eng-
lish 2010). However, in the literatures of political
science new layers of meaning emerged. In the realist
tradition of international relations, the terms nation and
state have often come to be used interchangeably. Some
lines of work have explored the meaning of this coinci-
dence, its fusion of belonging and governance. In the
nation-state an apparatus of governance ( ‘the state’) has
fused with the society it governs, so that the unit of gov-
ernance is asserted to be also in important respects an
integrated community and body politic: an identity-area
and not only a governance-area. Use of only a few terms
is inevitably imperfect for describing the many situa-
tions possible. In English, ‘state’ is ambiguous: it some-
times refers to a country and sometimes to its state
apparatus, because of the history of partial fusion.
‘Nation’ too is ambiguous: it sometimes refers to a
country but also has strong connotations of cultural
community. However, the term ‘nation’ does not now
imply necessarily a relatively full cultural or ethnic unity;
any significant degree of shared identity is sufficient,
and is typically achieved (despite considerable internal
heterogeneity) in important part through distinguishing
a ‘We’ as against a ‘They’. The disadvantage of the term
‘nation state’ then is to convey a too simple picture. The
hybrid term ‘nation-state’ is intended here to better sug-
gest, by its evident artificiality, the social construction of
a system of governance which includes both a notion of
civic belonging and citizenship and a culture of national
feeling and identity, the latter based on (in Benedict
Anderson’s term) an ‘imagined community’.
2 Economic calculation is, however, never more than part
of the causes of migration. Goldin, Cameron, Balarajan
(2011) note that the US mainland has three times the
average income and a quarter of the unemployment of
the American territory of Puerto Rico, whose residents
have the right to emigrate to the mainland – yet the
large majority choose not to (p. 100). Worldwide, eco-
nomic analysis alone cannot explain why still relatively
few people try to migrate, why emigrants are concen-
trated among particular social groups and localities, and
why even chronically ageing Japan holds out against offi-
cial in-migration. The relevant costs excluded by the
economic analyses include costs of meaning and iden-
tity too; thus Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan (2011),
using economists’ highly restricted notion of welfare
admit that their accounting is purely in ‘economic and
welfare’ terms (p. 269.) 
3 Of the Burmese women in Thailand interviewed for
chapter 4, three-quarters ‘related that they had migrated
out of a sense of duty to their parents’ (Pearson/Kusak-
abe 2012: 58), and many supported younger siblings.
They continue their remittances home much longer
than their male counterparts, including after marriage
(ch. 3). Yet having gone to Thailand to support their
families in Burma, many gradually lose their place and
social base in Burma but remain rejected outsiders in
Thailand and never achieve much security (chs 6, 7).
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tion and who are disproportionately subject to abuse.
In recent times both India and Indonesia, for exam-
ple, have been led in some cases to stop their citizens
taking up contracts abroad as domestic servants until
conditions were improved (see, for example, TIP 2010
on one Indonesian proscription on moving to such
work in Kuwait). But, as observed by Irianto and
Truong in chapter 2, of the 109 articles in Indonesia‘s
2004 law on the placement and protection of migrant
workers abroad, only eight cover protection. Women
are disproportionately affected too by the care bur-
dens that remain in the country of origin when men
or women leave to work in another country. Largely
similar issues arise in much intra-national migration
too.
The phrase ‘feminization of migration’ has be-
come popular to refer to women’s increasing statisti-
cal share in various migration streams (internal,
South–North, South–South). Studies in this book
show the importance of the qualitative dimensions, in
addition to headcounts: how migration practices bear
distinct gendered values, norms and characteristics,
the gender-differentiated treatment of migrants, and
gendered modes of migration and means of migrant
livelihood. That migration’s patterns and effects are
strongly gendered should be no surprise: gender is
not a peripheral decorative feature in social life but a
core dimension. Formal migration research has how-
ever been dominated by behaviouralist approaches
that are preoccupied with surface phenomena and
that try to build generalized models about, for exam-
ple, when people move and the impacts on economic
production (for further discussion, see Truong/
Gasper 2011a, and chapter 1 in this volume). The spec-
tacular rise in officially measured international remit-
tances, from an estimated US$31 bn. in 1990 to
US$316 bn. in 2009, has understandably attracted at-
tention. What migrants – especially migrant women –
experience and think has been a lower research prior-
ity, so that many of the realities of social life have
stayed relatively neglected. Yet according to studies re-
viewed in one recent survey of global migration (Gol-
din/Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 10–12), these new reali-
ties include accelerated innovation, including innova-
tion in identities (not least via the movement of brides).
Even Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan’s prominent
survey still in many ways reflects the slight and unbal-
anced attention typically given to migrant experience.
The lead author, Ian Goldin, earlier a vice-president of
the World Bank, heads the Oxford Martin School of
futures studies at Oxford University, and evinces
throughout the book a sympathy for migrants that re-
flects his own family history and personal trajectory,
as a progressive émigré South African of East Euro-
pean Jewish background. But the perspective remains
the abstracted generalized gaze typical of an econo-
mist. Women migrants receive very little specific men-
tion. Only two-thirds of the way through the book –
and two-thirds of the way through a fifty-page chapter
on the impacts of migration focusing overwhelmingly
on measured economic impacts – do women migrants
at last specifically appear, in one brief mention that
they are the most absolutely and relatively disadvan-
taged participants in labour markets compared to the
native workers (p. 194). The treatment of the social
costs of outmigration more broadly remains remarka-
bly brief and superficial (e.g. p. 193). In these respects
the book is typical of many treatments of migration,
which underrate the various aspects of societal repro-
duction, including the biological, familial, emotional,
psychological, and cultural.
The present book has in contrast explored the life-
worlds of migrants, especially migrant women, the im-
pacts on migrants’ security and insecurity of the sys-
tems of nation-state membership and exclusion and of
global market power, and how migrants seek to cope
and respond. This concluding chapter reviews and re-
flects on themes arising from these studies, from a
workshop on the draft volume held in Trivandrum in
February 2013, and from wider literatures.4 It does not
attempt a summary, which has already been offered in
chapter 1. Instead it essays an interpretation and com-
mentary with reference to key issues, of which some
are specific to women migrants and others common
to all migration or all international migration. Part of
our analysis will locate migrant women’s problems
within the context of market-dominated development
transformations and nation-state systems (sections
21.2–21.6); and part will highlight the specific and ad-
ditional difficulties that millions of migrant women
face, and the shifts of cognition and representation
that are needed to acknowledge and respond to these,
as well as sister shifts needed to respond to the struc-
tural forces that affect all migrants (sections 21.7–
21.9). Since the opening chapter has theorized gender
dimensions in some depth, this closing chapter pays
considerable attention to the latter forces too. It seeks
to identify causal structures and also their social con-
struction, and thus to indicate some spaces for reform
efforts. 
4 Our thanks go to all the workshop participants, not
least Indu Agnihotri, Ruth Pearson, and Anita Shah, for
helpful and thought-provoking contributions. 
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21.2 Migration is Major and Normal 
but is Treated as Exceptional and 
Ethically Aberrant
The 2010 World Migration Report reported 214 mil-
lion people now living outside their country of birth.
Sometimes it is observed that this constitutes only
three per cent of the world’s population, a modest
share that is little or no higher than twenty or a hun-
dred years ago. However, the figure is misleading in
several respects, quite apart from the question of the
possible and increasing exclusion of many irregular
migrants from the statistics. It does not include chil-
dren who have not themselves emigrated but have
been born in a different country from where their par-
ents were born and grew up, or have been left behind
and separated from one or both parents who have
emigrated. And it does not include other persons who
are also strongly involved: the other family members
and (former) close associates of the emigrants in their
country of origin; people who have moved earlier in
their lives but have returned to their country of origin;
people who are preparing to emigrate; and others
who are strongly affected by emigration, whether in
the countries of origin or destination or en route. If
we include these groups we talk of a figure several
times larger. Beyond this, and much more than in ear-
lier eras, the ‘transnational’ character of much
present-day movement – that so many people retain
strong connections with a land (or lands) of personal
or family origin, through more frequent visits and
communication, cultural exchange and identification,
strong family links, and even recurrent switches of
place of residence – has profound implications (see,
for example, Truong/Gasper 2008b, 2011b). 
The numbers of intra-national migrants are several
times higher: estimated at over 300 million in India
alone, including a large majority of women migrants
(whose primary recorded reason for migration is mar-
riage). Most of the themes that arise in the discussion
of international migration – of the economic impacts
of remittances and of absences and returns, of the po-
litical and psychological impacts of cultural change
and interchange, of social strains and endangered so-
cial cohesion, of changed gender roles, of the emer-
gence of new identities different from those prior to
the move, and more – often apply almost equally in in-
ternal migration. The existential gap between
Jharkhand and Delhi may well be bigger than that be-
tween Delhi and Dallas or Dubai.
In contrast to the scale of movements, much social
science and policy has been marked by ‘sedentary
bias’ (Castles 2009): movement from the location
where one was born is presumed to be abnormal, in
the normative sense too, and especially when we
speak of ‘location’ in terms of the scale of nation-
states. Thus migration studies are not treated as a nec-
essary dimension of all social studies but as a minor
specialism. Moving between locations, and certainly
moving between nation-states, is often presumed to
arise from some failing, inadequacy, or sickness in the
outmigration location’s economy or body politic. In,
for example, the leading American philosopher John
Rawls’s treatise The Law of Peoples, international out-
migration is taken as proof that the country of ori-
gin’s government has failed in its duties (see likewise
the work of Rawls’s prominent pupil Thomas Nagel
[2005]). International migration, in contrast to trade
or short-term travel, is thereby in this view excluded
from the sphere of matters that governments are mor-
ally obligated to regulate amongst themselves by mu-
tual agreement; instead, each government can regu-
late it as it sees fit. Such a perspective matches the
conflation of migration with pathologies of crime and
drug smuggling that has arisen in some ‘homeland se-
curity’-type thinking. Young people’s migration for
work is likewise often presented as overwhelmingly
due to the machinations of traffickers. Huijsmans has
analysed the prevailing narratives concerning the
movements of young women from Laos to Thailand
(Huijsmans 2011; and chapter 19 in this volume).
Movement supposedly destroys an idyll of childhood
and/or rural residence; and young women are pre-
sented as forced to move in order to compensate for
their drunken fathers’ failure to earn. Huijsmans re-
ports that the young Lao people he studied, not least
the girls and young women, often in fact seek to mi-
grate at an early age as a prestige-raising step towards
becoming an adult, and that they cope competently
with the challenges.
Movement by women is particularly prone to be
represented as abnormal. Processes of nation forma-
tion have often included the strengthening of an im-
age of women as symbols of family, domesticity,
motherhood, and tradition, as counter-poles to West-
ernization, and as requiring male protection (Chatter-
jee 1993). Migrant women’s lives expose and challenge
these hegemonic norms; women who move are then
liable to be treated either as trafficked or as perverted
and hence as having forfeited their rights (Kapur
2010).
Movement is a normal part of life and adaptation,
as we can see from all human history, implied the
World Migration Report 2008; though it was too cau-
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tious to say so openly, and so presented this position
as just one possible perspective (IOM 2008; Campillo-
Carrete/Gasper 2011). Goldin, Cameron and Balara-
jan state the position openly, after a pointed review of
human history. First, the human race is one. We all
stem from a core group of perhaps two thousand hu-
mans who lived in East Africa a modest 75,000 years
ago (Goldin/Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 12); they/we
then moved, across the world. Second, ‘Migration is
not a problem to be solved. It is an intrinsic element
of international society and inextricably bound up
with globalization itself’ (p. 260). Yet while movement
is normal, borders make it seem not normal, and lead
to special problems for migrants, pushed and pulled
by the pressures in the world political economy.
Rawls’s liberal justice framework uses the idea of
a social contract amongst citizens. It reasons in terms
of individuals who are tacitly viewed as members of a
nation-state, which is the frame for the social con-
tract, but not as residents of the globe who exist in
and through global webs of relationships. Extraordi-
narily – given its formulation within the USA, a coun-
try founded on immigration – the framework excludes
migrants and issues of immigration (Gasper 2011).
What we can call its Westphalian perspective com-
bines a normative nationalism – moral communities
are held to exist only within borders, not across them
– with an explanatory nationalism that seeks to ex-
plain and allocate responsibility for events within a
country’s borders exclusively within those borders, as
do Rawls and Nagel and the governments of some
rich countries. “[R]ich countries that energetically ex-
port arms to troubled poor countries whose manufac-
tured and agricultural exports they at the same time
firmly restrict through use of tariff and non-tariff bar-
riers, while also drawing away their best educated per-
sonnel, yet hold the poor countries overwhelmingly
responsible for their failed systems of governance and
thereby draw no conclusions of moral obligation for
themselves – obligations to help constructively, to
cease destructive exports, to open economic opportu-
nities, and to admit more deserving migrants”
(Gasper/Truong 2010a: 345–346). As global economic
forces feed into local political conflicts and dynamics,
the categories of economic migrant and political refu-
gee merge in many cases, but this is denied in political
philosophies grounded on nation-states. 
Castles points out that most social science has
shared the sedentary bias seen in modern nation-state
policies. By the late twentieth century, however, we
could no longer plausibly treat the nation as the natu-
ral, self-enclosed ‘society’-cum-‘economy’-cum-‘polity’
that had been typically assumed in the social sciences
since their origins and codification in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries (Wallerstein et al. 1996). The
assumption that the nation-state, an apparatus of rule
over a given geographical territory, also represents an
economic and sociocultural community and exercises
close control in it has come to diverge too far from re-
ality. The present-day scale of flows of messages,
ideas, hopes and values, commodities and finance, of
longer-term and permanent migrants and refugees,
and of short-term visitors, pathogens, weapons, and
technologies, has required changes in social sciences’
traditional choice of the boundaries of states as the
main frame for organizing their attention. 
21.3 Global Interconnectedness and 
Global Economic Forces 
Methodological nationalism in social science analyses
– automatically taking the nation as the appropriate
framework – is obsolete. The much discussed ‘tran-
snational migration’ of the past generation, for exam-
ple, has involved the maintenance of ongoing intense
interactions with the area of origin, including through
trade, movements to and fro of persons, cultural rela-
tions and exchange of ideas, and much more. It is part
of an increased global interconnectedness that gener-
ates global-wide streams of ‘side effects’ that render
nationally-enclosed analyses outdated. This book is
part of an ongoing passage from a conception of ‘in-
ternational migration’ (a definition based on the na-
tion-state as a unit and actor in international relations)
to a conception of ‘transnational migration’ (based on
the recognition of a transnational space formed by
the trans-boundary activities of a variety of actors, in-
cluding but not limited to the nation-state). The
former conception is associated with a primary focus
on the management of aggregate flows between coun-
tries (population, goods, finance, skills, etc.). The lat-
ter conception tries to grasp the interactions between
the global and local dynamics of migration, and re-
quires a multi-pronged approach in research, advo-
cacy, and policy advice. Debates on migration that use
an ‘international migration’ conception often fall into
a “North versus South” framework which depicts a ge-
ographical divide and a binary opposition of power
(North) versus vulnerability (South). More fruitful for
dealing with contemporary realities in migration is to
study structures, networks, and relationships that cut
across national boundaries, including the practices
adopted by migrants and their trans-local networks, in
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interaction with different state agencies, employers,
migration brokers, and so on. 
Kaye (2010) illustrates the interconnectedness by
looking at some of the drivers of outmigration from
Senegal. Senegalese farmers are out-competed by sub-
sidized foreign produce, and many Senegalese fisher-
men have been displaced by foreign factory trawlers
that exceed their approved catches. Eighty per cent of
the country’s rice is now imported. European govern-
ments see, or acknowledge, no causal connection be-
tween these economic patterns and the presence of
European Union Frontex ships off the Senegal coast
to block attempts at migration, sometimes in canoes,
across the ocean to outlying territories that belong to
Spain and Portugal (Kaye 2010: 232–235). Tandian and
Bergh’s chapter in this volume noted how the Spanish
government in 2008 recruited two thousand (again)
Senegalese ex-fishery workers on permanent con-
tracts. Kaye quotes the ambassador of Senegal to
Spain – ‘I think if Spain offered employment contracts
in Senegal, it is because somewhere there is the phe-
nomenon of canoes’ – and shows us how behind the
canoes are the factory trawler boats, the European
Union’s subsidies to fishers and farmers, and its de
facto barriers to many types of processed and manu-
factured imports. 
To draw these connections has been taboo in
Northern governments and businesses; no global-
wide social impact assessments of policies and pro-
grammes are undertaken. Kaye adds that the huge In-
ternational Organization for Migration (IOM) con-
tains negligible expertise on local development,
because its central function has been to shift cheap la-
bour into metropolises when it is required and back
again when it is no longer wanted there. Despite
IOM’s name, forty per cent of its 2009 budget was
funded by one country, the USA (Kaye 2010: 249).
The broader picture he presents is of how, being able
to rely on a huge reserve labour army – from, for ex-
ample, the Philippines, thanks partly to the lack of
land reform there (Kaye 2010: 39) – a footloose global
capitalism pulls people here and there, whenever con-
venient to business, and whatever the formal legality. 
Intensified global interconnections mean that not
only do the actions of the strong impose ‘externali-
ties’ on the weak worldwide, but also that sometimes
and increasingly the weak ‘talk back’, whether
through conscious reactions or through ramifying
chains of consequences, such as in the fields of envi-
ronment, education, and health. Old habits of the
strong – imposing negative ‘externalities’/‘side-ef-
fects’/‘collateral damage’ on the weak – can boomer-
ang and damage the strong too. Neglecting the educa-
tion and care of some groups of international migrant
children, within a framework of self-oriented national
governance, for example – as in Japan or Thailand,
where often the children of foreign workers have had
and still have no de facto right to education (chapters
4 and 17) – may eventually lead to sad and disruptive
outcomes. So can their exclusion from health care sys-
tems, and the roles of social inequalities in the emer-
gence and spread of diseases (Farmer 1996). Under-
mining of local economies and of the care of children
whose parents work abroad can lead eventually to a
next generation of economically and psychologically
displaced young people whose actions will not remain
confined, in execution and effects, by national bound-
aries. Conflicts can spread, just like disease. 
In the longer run, legal exclusion but de facto ad-
mission of low-skilled workers creates in some coun-
tries an undereducated marginalized underclass. It
provides a supply of cheap labour, but can foster a
world of associated illegality and criminality – of
‘black money’, bribes, and marginalized people who
lack qualifications – whose existence then serves in
the ideological reproduction of a certain sort of sys-
tem of rule. It isolates a group or groups who are
deemed ‘other’ and can be viewed as dangers: ‘they’
must ‘therefore’ be ruled firmly by a tough-minded na-
tional elite. The underclass can fulfil the role of scape-
goat and be blamed for various social ills in a way that
removes criticism from, indeed mobilizes support for,
national elites (see chapter 20 by Sandoval-Garcia on
these cultural dynamics in Costa Rica, Abella [2013]
on attitudes to migrants in ASEAN, and De Genova
[2005]). The politics of securitization of borders in
various parts of the world has eroded existing protec-
tion systems and promoted xenophobic sentiments.
These have in turn encouraged ever more stringent
practices of migration management where thinking is
in terms of “flows of people” across borders rather
than with understanding of persons having their own
histories, networks, and contributions.
21.4 The Attempted Maintenance of 
Nation-State Projects Through 
Migration Regimes of 
‘Temporary’ and ‘Irregular’ 
Workers
In many respects global economic forces act in ways
that do not respect, and can undermine, a system cen-
tred on nation-states. The global system of market
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capitalism causes calculations and decisions to be
made in the light of worldwide market alternatives
and opportunities. However, while globalist in this re-
gard it is like the system centred on nation-states in
another way: it has no inherent respect for universal
human rights; its calculations concern profitability.
Partnerships between the system of market power and
the nation-state system have emerged around the ex-
ploitative use of migrant labour (Gasper/Truong
2010a). Since women’s labour too is a space for inten-
sified exploitation, migrant women’s labour is such a
space par excellence. 
A ‘migration regime’ is a system of regulation of
migration that covers far more than formal laws and
written regulations. De facto systems of national and
international regulation of lower-skilled migrant work-
ers frequently allow additional value to be extracted
from these workers through their official rejection as
legal migrants. Huijsmans (2011; see also chapter 19),
for example, noted that Laos (the Lao People’s Dem-
ocratic Republic) prohibits the recruitment of Lao
workers for unskilled work in Thailand, and yet all
participants know that this is what the largest group
of Lao international migrant workers do. Kusakabe
and Pearson in chapter 4 demonstrated the impacts of
the migration regime for foreign women workers in
Thailand and the human costs of a blinkered ap-
proach (see also Doneys 2011; Pearson/Kusakabe
2012). Negative impacts are partly deliberately dis-
criminatory and partly unintended in countries where
economic expansion induces in-migration, particu-
larly to activities which citizens become unwilling to
undertake, and yet where national identity is a prod-
uct in the making or something that is reviving. Many
migration regimes are attempting to control a transna-
tional phenomenon that is unavoidable, but are doing
so while an exercise in nation-building is still going
on. In such situations Mushakoji (2011) warns against
attempts to directly enforce universal humanist values
in order to defend migrants, for migrant rights will
then be reviled as imperialist imposition. He advises
instead seeking creative syntheses of humanist values
with compatible strands in the national culture.
A migration regime extends across borders, and
interfaces with and links to other such regimes, as
shown by Irianto and Truong in chapter 2. Many ac-
tors are involved in the multi-billion-dollar migration
industry, in both its legal and illegal channels, includ-
ing not only recruitment agents and smugglers and
traffickers of persons, but especially the employers
and customers who benefit from the low-cost flexible
supply of labour power and goods and services. Even
Lao migrants with an ‘irregular’ status in Thailand are
part of a highly regulated system, regulated by the
Thai state and Thai employers. Employers prefer ille-
gal low-skilled foreign workers, for they are cheaper,
more vulnerable, more flexible and exploitable, and
easier to dismiss and expel than legals. Their very ‘ir-
regularity’ increases the demand for such labour.
Piore (1979) long ago explored this rationale in a
North American context. Illegal labour has no rights
and no protection; its secretly sanctioned entry brings
no admission of the political sin of polluting the
motherland/fatherland through an open-door intro-
duction of aliens. Further, such workers have little or
no access to social benefits, and so, given that and
their low wages, they are obliged to have a high rate
of participation in work, often relatively dangerous
work (Goldin/Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 206–207).
The intensity of this rationale has increased since the
1970s as global competition has increased (Chun
2009; Hiemstra 2010): many employers prefer right-
less illegals, who have fewer alternatives also because
they have less education and less access to education.
The employers pay little or nothing towards the full
cost of the social reproduction of their labour force –
including the costs of bringing up and educating chil-
dren and caring for the old and the sick. These bur-
dens fall exclusively on the workers and their families,
especially the women. But relatively neglected chil-
dren may eventually disrupt this short-run market
logic of cost minimization.
Both ‘temporary’ and ‘irregular’ workers are now
found worldwide in huge numbers and proportions.
For the USA, Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan (2011)
cite recent estimates of twelve million irregular work-
ers, who have only a one to two per cent chance of
being caught (pp. 117–119). While border control in
the USA has grown enormously, the “percentage of
undocumented migrants working on US farms and in
low-level service occupations and construction also
rose continually” (p. 119). Kaye (2010) investigates
how this form of migration regime is constituted in
particular US states, such as in Texas’s alliance be-
tween business and migrant groups. Border control
schemes do not achieve their objectives, and com-
pared to the vast gains realizable potentially for all
parties by well handled legitimate migration they are
an anachronistic waste of resources, conclude Goldin,
Cameron and Balarajan (2011: 210). A theatrical appa-
ratus of border checking has been instituted – compa-
rable to the enforcement apparatus in the era of at-
tempted alcohol Prohibition in the USA – which
prevents relatively few people from entering (except
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for asylum seekers), and cannot prevent millions of
overstayers. ‘The [high] regulation/[low] enforcement
gap in low-skilled sectors represents a political com-
promise for governments that face pressure to be
“tough on illegal immigration”, when key sectors of
the economy depend on the low-skilled labour that
they provide’ (Goldin/Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 252). 
Comparable patterns apply, mutatis mutandis, be-
tween regions within a continental-size country, India,
where huge numbers of workers are controlled and
exploited in circuits of temporary and circulating la-
bour, as shown by Mazumdar and Agnihotri in chap-
ter 7 (see also Breman 2009). Internal xenophobia
against internal migrants serves as part of a similar so-
cial logic of creating and keeping a rightless class to
provide cheap labour. An extreme example of such a
pattern was apartheid South Africa pre-1994, which
even tried to turn itself from a single country into a se-
ries of supposedly separate nation-states, most of
which would be the ‘national homes’ of the low-wage
labourers, even if many of these had never lived in
their supposed ‘national home’. Capital was allowed
to move freely across the new boundaries, while la-
bour movements were to be strictly controlled. In
practice, irregular labour was still plentiful and – be-
cause irregular – cheap. The same pattern is seen in
contemporary practices in the USA and the European
Union.
The form of legal migration now put forward by
the governments of most rich countries and the mi-
gration management organizations that they support
is temporary migration. In effect the model country
in the contemporary migration order is the Philip-
pines, whose economy revolves around preparing its
workers for recurrent temporary emigration, as rela-
tively cheap, docile, and supposedly short-term labour
to fill slots identified by rich importing countries. The
Philippines is a demonstrably inferior development
model, socially and economically. As a substitute for
the sort of land reform and other internal reforms
that sustained the economic transformation of many
of its neighbours, it recurrently exports its citizens, at
considerable personal cost to them and their families
and children (see e.g. chapter 12 by Marin and Que-
sada).5 It is not gutted by this brain drain in the same
way as a country like Malawi, where the large majority
of doctors and nurses have left the country (Goldin/
Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 180), because the Philip-
pines specializes in training extra staff who will then
attempt to emigrate for at least some time. Some Fili-
pino doctors even retrain as nurses in order to more
readily gain access to the USA. 
Many contemporary projects to promote security
for citizens within labour-importing countries rest on
the insecurity of the lives of an underclass, those in
temporary work and irregular work, whose labour
power is wanted but who are not wanted as citizens.
Much current temporary labour, legal and illegal, is in
effect indentured labour (see e.g. Pearson/Kusakabe
2012, ch. 2, on the millions of foreign workers in Thai-
land). The workers are tied to a single employer and
a single location for a long period; payment is in part
only at the end of the period and subject to a series
of conditions. This is the case in Canada’s seasonal
worker scheme described by Goldin, Cameron and
Balarajan (2011: 132) that seeks to prevent long-term
entry; by contrast, a 2008 law allowed foreign gradu-
ates of Canadian universities to stay and work for
three years, in the hope of then culling the best of
them (p. 139). Similarly, Korea and Japan avoid official
in-migration, and draw instead on the labour of ‘train-
ees’ and students and overstayers (p. 131). In the Span-
ish seasonal agricultural work scheme studied by Tan-
dian and Bergh (chapter 3), most of the Senegalese
workers quickly ‘absconded’ to elsewhere in Spain to
seek work with better prospects, particularly work
with a longer time horizon.
Historically, indentured labour paralleled and then
replaced slavery. Not only was it the format used to
bring South Asian and East Asian workers to the
Americas, South Africa, and elsewhere after the aboli-
tion of slavery, but before then: “of all the colonial
white immigrants [to the thirteen colonies that be-
came the USA] between 1580 and 1775, more than half
came as indentured servants who had agreed to pro-
vide several years of labor in exchange for passage,
food, protection, and eventual landownership” (Kaye
2010: 127). Nowadays, vast numbers of South Asians,
South-East Asians, and Africans working in West Asia
are de facto indentured, but, as in many other con-
temporary cases, they have no path for movement to
citizenship – unlike in the American case in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. 
5 Philippines government induction courses to prepare
emigrants for international employment as domestic
servants tell them not to expect more than five hours
sleep a night, but do not tell them that the contracts
they sign in the Philippines will often be replaced by far
more unfavourable contracts when they reach their des-
tination (Marin 2013).
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21.5 Who Counts? National Versus 
Market Versus Humanist Frames
This book has explored the forms of insecurity expe-
rienced by “people on the move” (CHS 2003) who
straddle different jurisdictions and systems of social
protection. The two stances we have just highlighted
– a nationalist stance that gives weight only to the in-
terests of citizens of one’s own nation, and a market-
oriented stance that gives weight only to the expan-
sion of economic profit – represent two of the poles
within the political landscape. A more formal analysis
helps to clarify this. Table 21.1 uses two dimensions
for classification: 1. how far is global community – the
existence of values and responsibilities of global
scope – accepted? and 2. how important are national
community and national boundaries deemed to be?
Cosmopolitan positions hold that: all humanity is the
reference group in ethical discussions, some important
common values apply across humanity, and some re-
sponsibilities exist across all humanity. In full cosmo-
politanism (#7), an extensive set of values is deemed
universally appropriate and to be promoted. In con-
trast, ‘international scepticism’ (#3) holds that coun-
tries do and should pursue only their own interests.
These sceptics concerning inter-national morality are,
however, believers in intra-national morality (unlike po-
sition #9b). In contrast, libertarian-minimalist positions
(#9 especially) first assign no special priority to na-
tional boundaries: individuals and their liberties are all
that matter worldwide, not nations/states, which must
not interfere with those liberties; and second, libertar-
ian-minimalists deny having significant responsibilities
to almost any others, not only to foreigners. 
The formal analysis reveals more positions besides
the three corner positions (3, 7, 9) that we have men-
tioned. ‘Scandinavian’ positions combine strong na-
tional feelings and strongly felt global obligations
(#1). Position 2 is an ‘inter-nationalism’: while coun-
tries are the primary units, held together internally as
established communities, a community of countries is
held to have emerged to some degree, for and
through the regulation of their interactions; and this
inter-national community produces agreements which
must be respected. In a solidarism-pluralism variant of
cosmopolitanism (#4; Dower 1998), global-wide con-
cerns and obligations are emphasized but with accept-
ance of considerable variation in values and behaviour
between settings. And towards the bottom right of the
table are a range of positions held by business actors
(5, 6, 8), that represent variants around the full ‘liber-
tarian-minimalist’ category (9a, 9b). Market perspec-
tives can seek to turn almost everything into a com-
modity, including human life, human organs, the
human genome, even (in position 9b) legal rulings
and police services. But other market-based perspec-
tives include a greater acknowledgement of the pru-
dence and/or appropriateness of accepting certain el-
ements of obligation in relation to compatriots or
even to all fellow humans (positions 5, 6, 8).
In the era when Europeans wanted to spread out
and trade as they wished, in China, India, and the
Americas, they put forward cosmopolitan doctrines
which gave people a natural right to move in this way. 
Table 21.1: Viewpoints in Global Ethics. Source: Adapted from Gasper (2005a).
Viewpoints In Global Ethics Extent of Values and Responsibilities With Global Scope
Extensive Modest / Slight None
Are
national
(and regional)
boundaries
ethically
important ?
Very important 1. ‘Scandinavian’ 2. ‘Inter-nationalist’ (which 
includes some communi-
tarians)
3.  ‘International sceptic’
Plus some communitari-
ans & post-modernists
Intermediate
importance
4. ‘Solidarist- plural-
ist’ 
5. Transnational corporations 
with national loyalties/ pri-
orities but some accepted 
global duties
6. Typical domestic corpo-
ration
Not important 7. Full cosmopoli-
tans (‘solidarist-
globalist’) e.g. 
pure utilitarians
8.  ‘Libertarian-minimalist’ I: 
e.g. transnational corpora-
tions without national loy-
alties but with some 
accepted necessary global 
duties
9. ‘Libertarian-minimalist’ 
II:
9a Business-only corporati-
ons
9b Robber-baron businesses
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Francesco de Vitoria (1492–1546), considered by many
to be the founder of international law, wrote that “[i]t
was permissible from the beginning of the world, when
everything was in common, for anyone to set forth and
travel wheresoever he would.” Similar ideas appeared in
the works of other great jurists of the time, including
Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Samuel von Pufendorf
(1634–1692), and Christian Wolff (1679–1754), who
argued that the state possessed a duty to allow the tran-
sit (and sometimes residence) of migrants (Goldin/
Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 42).
By the late nineteenth century in Europe passports
had come to be seen as feudal relics, only still used in-
ternally by feudal states such as Russia. In 1892, the In-
stitute of International Law declared that free entry
was the norm and should only be curtailed for special
and very weighty reasons (Goldin/Cameron/Balara-
jan 2011: 71). However, passports re-emerged in the
run-up to the First World War, and by the 1930s the
norm had been reversed. The Netherlands refused to
admit Jews in the 1930s unless they could prove that
they faced an “immediate danger to life” (p. 83). This
principle is now widely applied by rich countries. The
ranking of the liberal principles of securing individual
freedom and allowing individual endeavour versus the
nationalist principles of restricting rights and respon-
sibilities to only those people within national borders
has been inverted. Within liberal countries people
have the right to move, and cannot be legally pre-
vented from entering a community by the local com-
munity itself, but between countries these rights have
disappeared (Goldin/Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 266–
267). To a full cosmopolitan these are feudal attempts
to protect unjust privilege (Carens 1987); and for Gol-
din et al., given their perspective that all humankind is
a relatively new enterprise by two thousand African mi-
grants, ‘the earth is one country and all of humanity its
citizens’ (Goldin/Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 285).
Nowadays, the global neo-liberal governance re-
gime is a hybrid that asserts that national boundaries
have high ethical status in respect of people – foreign-
ers will be kept out – but have no status in respect of
capital: commodities and finance must flow without
hindrance. This version of neo-liberalism is far from
textbook nineteenth-century liberalism and market
doctrine, and is not a pure position. It is laced with
rich-country chauvinism, and aims to marry the pos-
sessive individualism of market thinking with the
pseudo-communalism of nationalism. Different ar-
rangements are then constructed for: 1. drawing on
high-skilled workers from poorer countries; 2. making
use of but socially excluding low-cost lesser-skilled for-
eign labour, in those labour-intensive tasks which can-
not be relocated to low-wage countries, in particular
many tasks in the agriculture, construction, personal
services, and care sectors – some in legally approved
temporary arrangements and some in formally irregu-
lar but tolerated shadow zones; and 3. marginalizing
and excluding other groups, both within and outside
a country, as part of the ideological legitimation of
rule by a national elite. For asylum seekers, “the three
Ds” are deployed – the instruments of destitution, de-
tention, and deportation (Hintjens/Kumar/Puri
2011). Overall, the layered system of privilege, exclu-
sion, and deportation has thought-provoking resem-
blances to what was pioneered by apartheid-era South
Africa, and is seen by some as a system of global
apartheid (Hintjens/Kumar/Puri 2011; Mine 2011). As
with apartheid South Africa, reforming such a system
requires looking in a differentiated and empathetic
way at the concerns of all parties, taking into account
their psychological as well as economic insecurities.
A possibly enlightening parallel emerged in chap-
ter 8 in this volume by Zhu and Lin on China. In this
subcontinental-size country, perhaps the largest migra-
tion flows for employment in world history have been
under way during the past generation. There have
been very high average income differentials between
the main in-migration areas, mostly in the coastal
provinces, and the main outmigration areas, mainly in
the interior. The majority of migrants do not make a
once-for-all transfer to in-migration areas. They con-
tinue moving to and fro, and/or plan to return even-
tually to their area of origin (if not necessarily to their
place of origin), for reasons of family loyalty, senti-
ment, access to land, and/or lack of access to many
registration-based rights and privileges in the place of
in-migration, but also because of lack of access to sta-
ble urban employment. A large proportion of urban
jobs are in rapidly changing sectors in which firms’
workloads fluctuate markedly, and lay-offs are as fre-
quent as hirings. From their own studies of internal
migrants and review of many related studies, Zhu and
Lin (p. 167) recommend that “the protection of the
rights of migrants should not rely on ‘urban citizen-
ship’, and the whole society (rather than the destina-
tion cities) should bear the responsibility for protect-
ing the rights of all citizens, including female and male
migrants, no matter where they live.”
The policy in many in-migration countries is now
to promote regulated temporary and circular migra-
tion and to exclude the migrant ‘denizens’ from full
rights. That stance has been defended (for example by
Gerhard Leers, the Netherlands minister for immigra-
tion and integration in 2010–12) on the grounds that
‘Women in Motion’ in a World of Nation-States, Market Forces, and Gender Power Relations 377
rich countries do not wish to have any second-class
residents and ‘so’ insist on having only temporary reg-
ulated in-migrants rather than long-term irregular in-
migrants. A third option – permanent in-migrants who
acquire citizenship – is very largely closed. Principles
of reciprocity and solidarity apply amongst citizens,
but supposedly ‘win-win’ deals will be negotiated with
non-citizens, such as redundant Senegalese fishermen
or young Burmese women seeking to support their
struggling families, that take advantage of their mar-
ginalized position. In contrast, the proposal for China
is to move to a ‘whole society’ approach with special
attention to the interests of temporary and circular
migrants, so that they accumulate rights from their
years of work that are later transferable elsewhere. 
21.6 A Human Development and 
Human Security Perspective 
A human development and human security approach,
as articulated by, for example, Mahbub ul Haq, insti-
gator of the work on Human Development Reports,
attempts to apply a global, humanist perspective both
in descriptive and explanatory work and in normative
and policy work (UNDP 1990, 1994; Haq 1999). It
uses a wide-angle lens that leads us beyond the
bounds to analysis conventionally set by national fron-
tiers and disciplinary divisions. At the same time it
uses a zoom lens, to look at how particular people ac-
tually live and can live: at their opportunities that are
attainable and valued through reason – this is the ‘hu-
man development’ reconceptualization of ‘develop-
ment’ – and at the risks and pressures to which peo-
ple’s lives are subject within global, transdisciplinary
systems of interconnection: the ‘human security’ focus
within the ‘human development’ agenda (Brauch
2009; Gasper 2005b, 2009, 2010; Truong/Gasper
2011b; UNESCO 2008). The concept of human secu-
rity focuses on ‘critical, severe or pervasive threats to
the vital interests of human life, livelihood or dignity,
where the harm caused can be prevented or mitigated
by human action’ (Lester 2010: 322).
A concern with the meanings and sources of peo-
ple’s security and insecurity helps us to think about
what matters most in their lives and how they are af-
fected by the intersections of different factors – gen-
der, class, race, religion, sexual identity, age, national-
ity, chance events – that structure and affect their
lives, their opportunities and risks, rises and falls
(Leichenko/O’Brien 2008; Gasper 2013). By situating
individuals socially, such an approach becomes less in-
dividualistic than unnuanced human rights thinking,
while encouraging sensitivity to subjectivities (Burgess
2007; Gasper/Truong, 2005, 2010b). It strengthens
the basis for taking human rights seriously (Oberoi
2010). By looking at the capability of people and
groups to maintain, restore, and promote their own
security – ‘securitability’ (UNDP 2003) – it partners,
and helps to set priorities within, work on ‘human de-
velopment’. Reflecting the realities of a transnational
and interpenetrated system, it goes beyond the West-
phalian conception of states and citizenship. ‘Non-cit-
izens are not viewed as non-persons or “outsiders”, as
they are under the state-centric system of interna-
tional relations, but as equal citizens in the global
community facing interdependent and universally rel-
evant threats’ (Edwards/Ferstman 2010: 40). Overall,
it offers a commodious framework that respects the
richness of listening-oriented fieldwork about daily liv-
ing, the style of research seen in nearly all the chapters
in this book, and that at the same time connects well
with themes of global interconnection. The book has
followed this agenda, as well as paying attention to
the influence, in combination with other factors, of
gender norms, including forms of gender blindness.6
Rich countries have sought to enforce a global or-
der of open trade and capital flows, but with close
regulation and restriction of flows of people, or to be
more exact, of poor people. Some at least amongst
their leading decision-makers know that the full logic
of economic benefit from free trade applies only
when all factors of production can move; but they
have calculated that stronger actors can reap most of
their own potential benefits without (officially) allow-
ing poorer people to move, and they do not feel in-
clined to increase the dissatisfaction of some groups
in rich countries by openly imposing upon them cul-
tural stresses from immigration in addition to the eco-
nomic stresses engendered by free trade and free
movement of capital. Ignoring the principle of com-
mon (shared) security, they have calculated that ghet-
tos of frustration created in pockets such as the
driven-out fishing communities of Senegal can be se-
6 Whereas a significant body of work has now appeared
that looks at migration in human security terms, the
national framing inherent in National Human Develop-
ment Reports has meant that none of the many such
Reports that have explicitly investigated human security
have taken migration as a lead theme (Gomez/Gasper/
Mine 2013). In contrast, the Commission on Human
Security (CHS 2003) used a global framing and treated
migration in detail in its chapter ‘People on the Move’;
for an evaluation, see Oberoi (2010). 
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questered, or they do not even consider such conse-
quences and the possible knock-on effects. The prin-
ciple of common security holds instead that no
sustained security can be obtained through undermin-
ing the security of those with whom one interacts
(Lester 2010; Mushakoji 2011).
The social order in much of Europe and in Japan
and perhaps some other countries, their human secu-
rity in the long run, may also not be sustainable as the
proportion of old people rises dramatically and care
burdens are not absorbed by succeeding generations
(UN Report on Replacement Migration 2001). The
widespread pattern of continually increasing orienta-
tion to earn, spend, and consume; declining family
care of the absolutely and relatively increasingly nu-
merous elderly; and fewer women (let alone men) in-
terested in bearing and caring for families that are on
average of replacement size, let alone in caring for the
previous generations, while at the same time coping
with – or forgoing – the pressures and challenges of
paid employment, might constitute in total one of
what Daniel Bell (1996) called ‘the cultural contradic-
tions of capitalism’. The sheer extent of demographic
imbalance in much of Europe and in Japan makes it
difficult politically and socially, however, for these
countries to swallow the scale of immigration re-
quired to counterbalance the consequences of wide-
spread – sexist, individualist, consumerist – cultural
proclivities. 
Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan propose (2011:
253) that the huge and growing gaps in the market for
lower-skilled labour in rich countries cannot be
bridged by the various subterfuges of undocumented
migration; nor will permanently circulating work-
forces from South to North, Philippines-style, make
sufficient economic or functional sense or be sustain-
able. For highly-skilled labour, they project that pres-
sures to import will mount, and will collide with do-
mestic resistance, at least in unprepared and fearful
low-trust countries. They present a picture of vast po-
tential economic gains from bringing labour to where
demand for it exists, and cite World Bank estimates
that economic benefits for countries of origin from
expanded migration – of which a very large share
would be by women – would vastly exceed those from
full free trade or doubled international aid (Goldin/
Cameron/Balarajan 2011: 163). Recipient countries,
too, could benefit hugely, for example by releasing
skilled women into the labour market, as described by
Sandoval-Garcia for Costa Rica in chapter 20. Given
labour market stratification, the evidence is that most
immigrant workers do not compete with domestic la-
bour and so do not significantly reduce domestic
wages in in-migration countries (Goldin/Cameron/
Balarajan 2011: 166) but do significantly reduce the
cost of wage-goods and services. 
This sort of economic accounting is not sufficient
for understanding the life impacts, including felt im-
pacts and impacts not measured in money terms, for
both immigrants and in-migration country residents;
and consequently is not sufficient for devising and
managing relevant, workable and just policy regimes.
Widespread resistance and antipathy to immigrants is
common: in Assam, Malaysia, South Africa, and Thai-
land, for example, not only in Italy, Japan, and the
Netherlands; even, as seen in this book, to Nicara-
guans in Costa Rica, despite their major contributions
to the country’s agricultural exports and to freeing its
middle-class women (and men) for paid employment.
National identity and the nationally specific notion of
citizenship are constructed in contrast to marginalized
or excluded Others. The contemporary Indian state
sometimes demonizes Bangladeshis, former fellow-
residents of unpartitioned India, to the extent of peri-
odically shooting some of them along the now partly
fenced border as they continue to cross as always
(Human Rights Watch 2010). Their exclusion helps to
define something non-Indian, and hence to define ‘In-
dia’ (Kapur 2010: 200–1). In the Netherlands the prin-
ciple of shared membership of ‘ons land’ (our country)
conflicts with continuing race-based identification, in
which the descendants of immigrants from some coun-
tries remain classified as allochtoon (from another
soil), generation after generation. 
Temporary-migration programmes plus the twi-
light status of de facto tolerated ‘irregulars’ seem de-
signed to prevent any impression that a government
treats new immigrants better than long-standing resi-
dents, but whether they will satisfy traditional resi-
dents, when these are exposed to exclusivist ideolo-
gies and a perpetual stream of transient foreigners
rather than to emergent fellow-citizens, remains ques-
tionable. Further, major programmes of this type in
the past in Germany and the USA have in reality still
largely led to permanent settlement; they on balance
discourage return to country of origin since migrants
realise they cannot readily come back again (de Haas
2012). Similarly, felt security is not furthered by the
parallel system of de facto tolerated irregular migra-
tion, but rather by the building of migrant loyalty to
the country of in-migration by providing legal chan-
nels for entry and channels for legalization. 
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21.7 A Gender-enriched Human 
Security Perspective
Let us review our arguments up to this point. We have
identified and contrasted, first, “a nationalist perspec-
tive that adopts only the nation as its ethical space,
and typically adopts a national frame in explanation
too; and second, a capitalist perspective that adopts a
global frame in both evaluation and explanation, but
with enormous exclusions in concern for poor people”
since its measures in evaluation are purchasing power
and completed monetary transactions (Gasper/Truong
2010a: 348-9). We contrast both these with the ‘human
discourses’ fostered in the United Nations system: hu-
man development and more especially human rights
and human security. These adopt “a global normative
frame, in two senses – a comprehensive interest in the
contents of people’s lives, and a concern for people
everywhere, grounded in perceptions of human dignity
and fundamental rights” (Gasper/Truong 2010a: 349).
Work on human security in particular combines
“‘joined-up thinking’ in explanation – a tracing
through of fundamental interlinkages that cross na-
tional borders and conventional disciplinary bounda-
ries – with cosmopolitan ‘joined-up feeling’ in valua-
tion, giving priority to basic needs everywhere” (ibid.:
349). These human discourses, while open to differ-
ent versions and emphases, are close partners and are
readily and desirably combined. For our purposes, it
matters relatively little whether the perspective is elab-
orated into an ethical viewpoint that corresponds to
position 1 or 4 or 7 in 21.1, for each of those po-
sitions incorporates extensive values and responsibili-
ties with global scope. 
Of central significance for our purposes, by con-
trast, is that like all the standpoints in social philoso-
phy that we have mentioned so far these discourses
are not explicitly gendered. The emphases in human
security thinking on human bodies, subjectivities, and
human  relationships make it a welcoming partner for
gender analysis; but while fully relevant to women,
there is no special emphasis on the distinctive pres-
sures, discriminations and disadvantages faced by
many women, especially women migrants, and how
they serve as social and economic ‘shock absorbers’
(Gasper/Truong 2005).7 Yet Kusakabe and Pearson
(chapter 4), for example, recount how the overwhelm-
ingly female Burmese work force in the Thai border
factories they studied face peculiarly harsh workplace
conditions and must also struggle and improvise to
fulfil the needs of social reproduction (material, gen-
erational, cultural), including care work, cooking, eco-
nomic support of a wider family, and especially the
bearing and upbringing of small children. Support
from the state (whether Thai or Burmese) and from
employers is almost entirely absent. Kusakabe (2013)
notes with irony how employers recurrently used the
phrase ‘We treat workers like family’, as an attempted
justification for employees’ lack of enforceable formal
rights and being always on call for more work rather
than having fixed maximum working hours. The
women improvise responses using community groups,
hired services, and family members, in addition to
their own efforts; for example, paying a ‘baby agent’
who transfers a batch of sedated babies back to their
mothers’ home places in Burma. None of these
means is highly satisfactory, stable and sustainable, so
the methods of coping change frequently. 
Women’s relative invisibility within discussions of
international relations and social justice is unaccepta-
ble. This volume and its predecessor (Truong/Gasper
2011b) attempt to contribute in countering lack of
gender awareness in regard to migration. They try to
describe, explain and evaluate the gendered structures
of intra- and especially inter-national migration and to
identify directions for countering the major injustices,
both those common to all migrants and those espe-
cially affecting women. While many of women mi-
grants’ problems and needs are the same as men’s,
some are distinctive, though those too can be fruit-
fully addressed if we harness and enrich the human
discourses in order to advance women’s rights, secu-
rity and development, rather than seek to build sepa-
rate approaches. 
For decades, the framework for international mi-
gration studies (as well as that of refugee studies) has
reflected mainly the experiences of men of productive
age, while the framework of human trafficking has
predominated in representations of the experience of
young and unmarried women. In recent years, espe-
cially around and since the High-Level Dialogue on
International Migration and Development initiated by
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2006),
there has been growing recognition of the increased
presence of women in migration streams – now at par-
ity with men’s – and of the factors behind it. We must
go further though, to undo biased assumptions linked
to gender that have been built into research concepts
7 Even an authoritative collection by human rights lawyers
on Human Security and Non-Citizens, edited by Alice
Edwards and Carla Ferstman, has little to say on
women. The 26-page index has no entries for ‘women’
or ‘gender’.
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and methods of data collection and interpretation.
The biases have important consequences for policy
choices in matters related to migration. Invisibility,
misrecognition, and inappropriate framing of gender
concerns are key issues for research on and advocacy
for social justice in migration.
The Migration, Gender and Social Justice (MGSJ)
research project from which this book emerged has
adapted Collins’s four-facetted ‘matrix of domination’
designed for Black studies to provide a framework for
studying the relations of gender subordination in mi-
gration (Collins 2000: 277; Truong/Gasper 2011a: 4).
The four facets, or levels, are as follows. First, the he-
gemonic level consists of entrenched ruling ideas, in-
cluding the dominant idea of the bounded nation-
state that has enforceable borders and a relatively
clear set of norms and rules to determine member-
ship. Cross-border migration has typically been under-
stood in terms of a series of dichotomies: ‘economic
migrants’ versus ‘refugees’, ‘free choice’ versus ‘force’,
men as ‘autonomous migrants’ versus women as ‘de-
pendants’. These dichotomies give legitimacy to prac-
tices that have consequences for (un)fair treatment.
They also fail to show the cumulative effects of inter-
sectionality and the spiral of discrimination caused by
multiple inequalities based on gender, ethnicity, and
migrant status. Second, the bureaucratic level con-
cerns state structures and the articulation and applica-
tion of regulations, norms, standards, and procedures
for specific groups of migrants, including the use of
surveillance practices.8 Third, the institutional level
concerns how migration institutions (organizations of
the state, migrant recruiting agencies, etc.) interact
with each other in gendered ways that can (re-)pro-
duce the series of dichotomous classifications of peo-
ple on the move (skilled–unskilled, legal–illegal, auton-
omous–dependent, etc.) with consequences for the
subordination of women as a group of migrants.
Fourth, the interpersonal level concerns how the
three facets above interface and are acted out in eve-
ryday social interactions in specific contexts: among
and between the migrants, the local communities,
support groups, and bureaucracies. The framework
helps to bring out the practical challenges for advo-
cacy for inclusive citizenship, due to the intersecting
forms of subordination and of legal liminality.
The framework helps us also in avoiding overgen-
eralizations about the relationship between gender
and migration. It is essential to recognize the impor-
tance of contexts and their particularities, the layers
of factors involved, and the interactions of gender
with other social statuses (legal identity as migrants;
class; race/ethnicity; age). Overgeneralizations hide
the various ways in which institutional power dynam-
ics circumscribe the space for women migrants to
claim rights. Discussion of social justice in relation to
migration needs to be informed by understanding of
the locally specific dynamics of migration and of or-
ganizational practices and legal regulations. We need
also to recognise, besides the material circumstances
that drive migration, the patterns of differentiation
among migrants, the sense of prestige that people at-
tach to ‘being mobile’, and the role of social networks
in the diffusion of images and norms regarding mobil-
ity within and across borders. 
Through exploration of the contemporary forms
of circular, temporary, and transient migration and
their gendered features, the studies in this volume
have revealed the multi-layered meanings of ‘gender’
and their intersectional expression in all stages of mi-
gration. The traditional framework for considering
women’s rights in terms of citizenship may be applica-
ble specifically to immigration (migration for perma-
nent settlement). In other migration forms, the tran-
snational character of power relations as well as their
local expressions and affiliated practices of gender-
based discrimination need to be analysed as a series
of interconnections between different institutions and
systems (households, communities, market-based re-
cruitment agencies, relations between sending and re-
ceiving states, work placement practices). A new ap-
proach to rights is necessary that recognizes the role
of multiple actors in multiple locations and that can
discern the different aspects of structural vulnerability
at each point in the entire migration process and de-
velop a corresponding picture of accountability. The
model presented in chapter 2 (table 2.2) is relevant
here in combination with the four-part framework just
described.9 They help us to examine the realities of
migrants’ lives.
8 Migrants are affected not only by the framework of clas-
sification of identities that separates them from nation-
als, but also by a hierarchy of identities within the
population of foreigners (as we see in chapter 13 on
Libya). Though the specific features of this hierarchy of
identities may differ according to the particularities of
geopolitical contexts, often the management of ‘flows’
(of people on the move) misframe some groups of
migrants and their identities into a ‘social problem’ that
supposedly requires a solution. This misframing can
conceal the need to examine dysfunctional aspects of
the management of migratory flows by the state and by
non-state actors. 
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21.8 Invisibility and Re-Cognition of 
Women’s Migration: Promoting 
Human Rights and Security 
The ‘invisibility’ and misframing of ‘migration’, mi-
grants, ‘gender’, and women’s work have conse-
quences for social justice, as seen throughout the
book. There are great limits to what one can achieve
by trying to reform policies, official rules, and actual
practices that violate migrants’ rights and human secu-
rity, especially for women migrants, if one does not
significantly alter the realm of cognitions about migra-
tion (including those we referred to above as ‘seden-
tary bias’ and ‘the hegemonic level’ or nation-centred
perspective) and about masculinities and femininities
(ideas about appropriate behaviours, roles, and rights
for males and females). 
The concept of ‘invisibility’ has arisen in several
different ways:
a) statistical invisibility, which leads to the invisibility
of women migrants in the eyes of planners, and
thus their exclusion from policy attention and
from activities for social protection (for example,
see chapter 7 on India); 
b) institutional invisibility (the fact of having no for-
mal status, or an unauthorized status), which
derives from the rigidity of tacit presumptions and
institutional settings, and excludes some migrants
from programmes that might benefit them (seen
in most chapters); 
c) strategic invisibility, chosen by migrants in order to
evade discriminatory practices by the state or abu-
sive behaviours at inter-group level or both (see,
for example, chapters 4, 6, 10); 
d) most importantly, invisibility in the sense of being
outside the realm of cognition as formal knowl-
edge and sometimes even as tacit knowledge; for
example, chapter 14 showed that the girl compan-
ions of blind beggars in Senegal and Mali are
socially invisible, simply not noticed; more widely,
much of the work done by women in caring for
dependants and in household management is not
perceived as real work. 
Cognitive invisibility is the most important, for it un-
derlies statistical and institutional invisibility which
then motivate strategic invisibility. Attaining institu-
tional recognition requires re-cognition.
The multiple layers of invisibility have implications
for migrants’ economic and sociocultural security in
their daily lives and in their relationship with agents of
the state. Invisibility (including the non-recognition of
migrants’ diplomas) and misframing (e.g. misuse of
the notion of ‘family’ to license unlimited calls on oth-
ers’ labour) are functional for powerful groups. We
are dealing here with social fields of power, not just
cognitive error. The struggles for rethinking are not
just cognitive struggles.
The social invisibility or scant recognition of much
of women’s work within a country makes it hard for
that country to make credible claims in support of its
own women emigrants who do such work – if the
country perceives and values their work at all. Coun-
tries which treat domestic workers within their bor-
ders as not ‘workers’ have little credibility when seek-
ing to defend such workers against abusive conditions
abroad. Indonesia’s Domestic Workers Protection
Bill, for example, remains unadopted, after years of
discussion of the issue. Similarly, countries which treat
in-migrants (and their own women workers) badly
have less clout when seeking to defend their own out-
migrant citizens (especially outmigrant women work-
ers). Cholewinski (2010) identifies the feminization of
migration (meaning here the increased proportion of
women) as one reason why migrant rights have not
been taken seriously by the governments of in-migra-
tion countries, nor sometimes by the countries of out-
migration. 
Invisibility, screening-out, is an extreme example
of misframing. Discussions about domestic labour
and domestic workers frequently involve other forms
of misframing, such as failure to connect the mass mi-
gration of women domestic workers to the ongoing
transformation in the organization of social reproduc-
tion for affluent groups, especially in rich countries.
Persistent misframing can contribute to eventual cri-
sis, which may then provide opportunity for refram-
ing, recognition, and affirmation of certain categories
of migrants whose presence and contributions to so-
ciety have been left invisible. 
Invisibility and misframing in terms of systems of
classification of work, workers and migrants must be
taken on board as issues of social justice. The systems
must not be taken as given. They are based on specific
knowledge frames which are time-bound and vulnera-
ble to errors and to institutional rigidity. Similarly, the
inherited legal approach to women’s rights in migra-
tion is partly embedded in a dated framework of
9 The model in chapter 2 can be seen as an elaboration
for migration of the questions raised by the ‘Institu-
tional Responsibility Matrix’ developed by Geof Wood;
see, for example, Gough and Wood (2004).
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group rights built on the rationale of protecting mi-
nority groups and minors. 
More widely, tacit social constructions of ‘mascu-
linities’ and ‘femininities’ affect subjectivities as well
as codified practices, and exercise great influence
both on how women, men, and young people become
involved in migration processes, and on how policies
of social protection are designed. The role frequently
accorded to women is that of the human shock ab-
sorber, the nurturing human environment for the ac-
tivities of others. Like shock absorbers and the physi-
cal environment they are taken for granted. 
The frameworks of human rights – for women, for
migrants, and for all persons – are nowadays elaborate
and quite clear; but they are not self-enforcing, and
their adoption and implementation is highly discre-
tionary and very frequently absent (see, for example,
the reviews by Cholewinski 2010 and Lester 2010 for
migrant rights). Application of the frameworks to
cases of international migration depends on collabo-
ration between nation-states, and thus also on the per-
ceptions of and pressures from the public in those
states. Hierarchical relations between nation-states,
economic and political agendas, and rigidity in admin-
istration make this collaboration ineffective. Parts of
civil society play an important role in the defence of
migrant rights, but civic actors too are embedded in
the national sphere of politics that is influenced by na-
tionalist sentiments that often do not favour such
rights. A large number of studies in this volume have
documented social processes of ‘racialization’ or
other types of social construction that present mi-
grant workers as inferior (and dangerous) beings.
Countering such processes is an essential task for in-
creasing the likelihood of the implementation of legal
declarations of migrants’ rights. Chapter 20 by San-
doval-Garcia, in particular, describes several relevant
avenues for this work.
Cholewinski (2010) lists, over very many pages,
the years of meetings and reports on migrant rights,
but can unfortunately provide little evidence of im-
pact. Oberoi (2010) and Lester (2010) fear that the
meetings are another form of theatre, for the more
general conventions on human rights, if taken more
seriously, would already accord major protection to
migrants. Apart from the power of groups that bene-
fit from the invisibility of migrant workers, Oberoi
notes another explanation, another type of invisibility
which is produced by the absence of migrant repre-
sentation. The meetings and negotiations are con-
ducted in closed chambers, with migrants’ own repre-
sentatives excluded. Thus ‘in inter-state discussions
the world over, agreement is reached that it is the mi-
grant who is to blame for the chaotic state of contem-
porary migration, it is the migrant who is a terrorist,
a queue jumper, a criminal; he or she is barred from
the rooms in which migration policy is being dis-
cussed’ and where rules are established and rein-
forced that render people on the move marginal and
illegal (Oberoi 2010: 272).
Research and advocacy guided by a human secu-
rity perspective can help expose what is kept invisible,
and so help to strengthen the perceptual, affective,
and political basis for giving serious attention to for-
mal human rights. Ethnographic research can present
migrants’ voices on their experiences of being invisi-
ble, of the multiple and interconnected layers of inse-
curity, and of negotiating recognition (such as success-
fully achieved by some of the Vietnamese brides in
Korea and Taiwan seen in chapter 5). Direct testimony
may counteract streams of misrepresentation and poi-
son in parts of the mass media and ‘give a voice to
some of the migrant women’, observe Pearson and
Kusakabe (2012: 176), who themselves use the
method to good effect. 
These voices also direct attention to the ways in
which the control of migrant workers is carried out.
Studying migration means studying not only migrants’
everyday lives but the systems of creating and control-
ling borders (legal, social, economic, and cultural)
that shape their life-worlds and restrict their agency.
This can help to bridge the gap of understanding be-
tween a state-centric notion of ‘national security’ and
a notion of how security is produced or undermined
locally by social interactions. 
Many people fear that the language of security is
“a double-edged sword. …it can label the subjects of
this security discourse as threats to security, rather
than being victims at risk of insecurity” (Edwards/Fer-
stman 2010: 40). A language of ‘human security’ in
particular is sometimes adapted to serve forms of dis-
cipline and control over migrant populations. How-
ever, similar types of labelling and control have hap-
pened for centuries and are not generated by a human
security perspective that specifically offers resistance
to racialization and related forms of othering and
scapegoating. Ensuring the rights of ‘people on the
move’ requires as the first step addressing the forms
of structural injustice they face. Human security anal-
ysis enters the life-worlds, constraints, opportunities,
and subjectivities of all participants and considers
how these are interlinked. As illustrated in this book,
it can help shift thinking about ‘security’ from border
control towards the notion of positive freedom for
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those who migrate or return. Eve Lester argues thus
that “the application of a human security lens to the
social and economic rights framework…may serve as
a counterweight to the forces of national security and
sovereignty that have historically dominated legal and
political discourse, often at the expense of justice”
(Lester 2010: 317). Human security analysis is an es-
sential partner to a human rights approach, not a di-
version or competitor (Lester 2010). 
 The structures, institutional and mental, which we
have identified and discussed are not subject to over-
night change. Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, as we
saw, closed their book with a cosmopolitan clarion
call in respect of free movement. But in terms of next
steps they presented a more modest proposal: to cre-
ate a global migration body that is divorced from the
direct control of rich in-migration countries, and that
can counter the policy patterns in which party politi-
cians appear largely trapped. They consider that such
an international lead agency can coordinate a long-
run agenda for increased international migration,
given its unavoidability. Reflecting its size and experi-
ence, the International Organization for Migration ap-
pears to them and to many as the logical choice, if
converted into a United Nations agency and thus with
an authority beyond the short-term political wishes of
rich countries that fund it (Goldin/Cameron/Balara-
jan 2011: 282). This was the recommendation of the
2005 Global Commission on International Migration;
it was blocked by in-migration countries. 
The next best next step brokered by Kofi Annan in
2006 – the Global Forum for Migration and Develop-
ment – is purely a non-binding discussion forum. But
Annan framed and launched it within a longer-term
perspective and with an attractive boldness of spirit.
For Annan, the rationale of the Forum was to gradu-
ally build awareness of patterns of interconnectedness
and progressively reduce the fears and misperceptions
of in-migration countries and more generally.10 While
the Forum conducts its business in closed chambers it
has become a prominent target of attention for civil
society. Migrant organizations, social movements, and
migration research bodies monitor, parallel, and
lobby the Forum’s activities. The spirit is consistent
with that in Sen’s approach to justice (2009): not a
perfectionist model but focused on relevant ameliora-
tions from real starting points. Within such a forum
and similar channels, and partnered by pressure from
civil society, progress is perhaps possible in some im-
portant areas.11 
21.9 Next Steps
We conclude with an indication of some of the key ar-
eas for research and networking. Existing work could
be deepened by using a human security perspective
that incorporates a gender framework as suggested
above.
First, transformations of borders: borders are
transforming in various ways: physically, the gatekeep-
ing functions to control and exclude migrants are now
dispersed across numerous locations, including within
the routines of daily life in the countries of in-migra-
tion and even the countries of outmigration; legally,
there are now huge grey zones of ‘legal liminality’; cul-
turally and psychologically, borders of various sorts
are being constructed and deconstructed. Illumina-
tion of the new meanings and practices of borders is
a research priority, to update the conceptual appara-
tus that we bring to considering migration and mobil-
10 Annan’s ‘program logic’, as diagnosed by Gasper and
Roldan (2011), was as follows: We should go ahead with
the Global Forum for Migration and Development,
given that: 1. We must manage migration, 2. in a con-
text where major disagreements exist, and a heritage of
casual, non-thoughtful, non-constructive behaviour; 3.
The alternatives are not feasible at present, whereas 4.
GFMD is feasible and 5. can be fruitful since controver-
sial emotive problems require calm, structured commu-
nication. This underlying set of ideas is open to critical
assessment and possible improvement.
11 In terms of table 21.1, different starting points and dif-
ferent potential paths can apply to, and within, different
constituencies: businesspeople and workers, politicians
and administrators, elites, marginal groups. Countries
that are presently strongly marked by business-centred
positions (6, 9) might gradually move towards positions
5 and 8, with growing recognition and acceptance of the
necessity and appropriateness of various duties that
cross national borders (and that apply within national
borders too). Roughly speaking, an author like Scheffer
(2007, 2011), reasoning within a world of nation-states
and of local communities, proposes a gradual progres-
sion of global awareness and trust, moving thus across
the top row in the diagram, from 3 to 2 to 1. He argues
that only by the promotion of healthy local interactions,
including a recognition of the historical and geographi-
cal strands that have contributed and continue to con-
tribute to the cooperative life in a locality, is the
required basis established for more trusting broader
interaction. Mushakoji (2011) proposes a fuller trajec-
tory, 3Æ2Æ1Æ4. He is at the same time strongly aware
of the dangers residing in positions on the right side of
the table, which can grow in reaction to premature
attempts to fulfil a cosmopolitan ideal of position 7.
384 Des Gasper and Thanh-Dam Truong
ity and thus to reorient subsequent research in a way
that does fuller justice to contemporary and emerging
systems. The emergence of new forms of female mi-
gration, temporary, circular, and transient, and how
these forms can produce conditions of insecurity not
experienced by settled migrants, needs research and
policy attention. The implications of border transfor-
mation and female migration for, not least, children (as
stay-behinds, or co-migrants, or born during migration,
or as returnees) have been noted here in the chapters
on Mexico, Mali, and Thailand. The existing group
rights approaches (e.g. women’s rights, children’s
rights, indigenous people’s rights) to migration seem
more applicable to the integration of settled migrants
in the host society than to the increasing number of cir-
cular, temporary, and transient migrant communities. 
Second, South–South migration has already be-
come equal in scale to South–North migration (as
conventionally measured) some years ago (UNDP
2009), and is likely to rapidly exceed it. Women are
very prominent in such movements. The large major-
ity of the component studies in the MGSJ project and
in this book address South–South migration, though
the original scheme of work was not formulated in
these terms. This trend throws up new questions.
However, because of the domination of research
agendas by the concerns and perspectives of North-
ern funders, South–South migration remains relatively
speaking less studied.  
One of the largest components of especially
South–South migration during the coming decades is
likely to be induced by climate change, given the
greater expected impacts of climate change in tropical
and subtropical areas and in low-income countries,
the economic dynamism in much of the South, and
intensive anti-immigration policy regimes in much of
the North (see, for example, McAdam and Saul
2010). The Bangladesh–India border is a likely exam-
ple of a major locus of such migration. While there is
growing research on climate change and migration,
relatively little has yet connected closely to the issues
of differential impacts on men, women, children, fam-
ily organization, etc.  
Thirdly, for both South–South and South–North
movements, and intra-national migration, portability
of social protection is a key transformative reform
needed to respect the human rights of the migrants
whom the global economic system requires and gen-
erates. The theme emerges strongly from the case
studies in this volume, for example those on China,
the Gulf, the Philippines, and Thailand. They reveal
the central tension between the mobility of labour
and the non-mobility of entitlements for most mi-
grants. For migrants whose movements are tempo-
rary, circular, or transient, social protection schemes
that can be made portable are vital. For example, In-
donesian migrant domestic workers pay for their
health and social insurance before departure, but they
cannot access this support when in need because of
institutional rigidity in the administration of labour
migration policy in Indonesia, as well as in the receiv-
ing country. Special attention needs to be paid to the
particular situations and needs of various categories
of women migrants, and to the role of organization of
and by migrant workers themselves to engage in cam-
paigns for portable protection and for acquisition and
then implementation of accorded rights.
The experience of the MGSJ project and the char-
acter of these concluding suggestions underscore the
need for the cross-fertilization of ideas between re-
gional research networks, South–South–North. Pro-
moting cooperation, in order to reduce duplication
and to avoid research driven by purely theoretical or
purely national policy interests without due consider-
ation for gender transformation as an ongoing proc-
ess integral to migration itself, can help to support a
bottom-up strategy of rights-claiming that responds
more directly to migrants’ needs and aspirations.
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